INDEX

Subject Index

	Page
Petition for writ of certiorari	1
Jurisdiction	4
Questions presented	4
Reasons for allowance of the writ	5
Prayer	6
Brief in support of petition	7
Opinion below	7
Questions presented	7
Specification of errors	7
Argument	7
The writ should be granted because the opinion below erroneously applied the doctrine of *Tool Co.* v. *Norris* and failed to give effect to applicable decisions of this Court	7
1. In ruling that there was no joint enterprise the opinion below failed to give effect to *Hyer* v. *Richmond Traction Co.*, 168 U. S. 471, 42 L. Ed. 547	7
2. In ruling that the agreement was void because of public policy within the doctrine of *Tool Co.* v. *Norris*, the opinion below failed to give effect to *Steele* v. *Drummond*, 275 U. S. 199, 72 L. Ed. 238 and *Valdes* v. *Larrinaga*, 233 U. S. 705, 58 L. Ed. 1163	12
Conclusion	16

Index of Cases

Aiken v. *Mills*, 144 F. (2d) 23	9
Anderson v. *Blair*, 202 Ala. 209	
Asiatic Exploration; In re, 41 F. (2d) 230	9
Dexter & Carpenter v. *Houston*, 20 F. (2d) 647	9
Hall v. *Anderson*, 18 Wash. (2d) 625	13

Page

Houlton v. *Nichol*, 93 Wis. 393 13
Hyer v. *Richmond Traction Co.*, 168 U. S. 471 6
Kasishke v. *Baker*, 146 F. (2d) 113 9
Motter v. *Smyth*, 77 F. (2d) 77 9
McGowan v. *Parish*, 237 U. S. 285 13
Nutt v. *Knut*, 200 U. S. 12 13
Oscanyan v. *Winchester Repeating Arms Co.*, 103 U. S. 261 13
Printing Co. v. *Sampson*, L. R., 19 Eq. Cas. 462 16
Providence Tool Co. v. *Norris*, 2 Wall. 45 ..... 3, 12
Steele v. *Drummond*, 275 U. S. 199 ..... 6, 13
Valdes v. *Larrinaga*, 233 U. S. 705 6

TREATISES AND ANNOTATIONS

46 A. L. R. 109 13
63 A. L. R. 909 9
12 Am. Jur. 710 14
Restatement of the Law of Contracts 15

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1946

No. 522

MAX SILVERMAN,

Petitioner,

vs.

OSBORNE REGISTER CO.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

To the Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your petitioner, Max Silverman, an individual, respectfully shows to this Honorable Court, as follows:

Petitioner's business is that of supplying premiums to radio sponsors of nationally advertised goods (R. 12), and pins and emblems to such organizations as the American Red Cross, British War Relief Society and Office of Price Administration (R. 12, 13, 14, 19). In June, 1943 (R. 20), petitioner began to work with representatives of the Office of Emergency Management, Office of Price Administration and War Production Board in connection with the develop-

ment of information relative to the requirements to be adopted by the Government for the manufacture of ration tokens for the national rationing program (R. 38) and the availability of acceptable materials for such manufacture. This early work was performed by petitioner with the expectation that he would personally submit a bid to manufacture the required tokens in connection with the Government contract for their manufacture which was to be awarded by competitive bidding (R. 39). He spent all of his time and energy on the project and neglected his other business completely while doing so (R. 27).

After petitioner had made an arrangement with the respondent for the latter to manufacture the required ration tokens for him as petitioner's sub-contractor (R. 11, 12, 39), petitioner was informed by the O.P.A. that he could not bid on the ration token contract because the Government intended to maintain close surveillance over the tokens and their manufacture and he did not own the factory in which the manufacturing was to be done (R. 13, 39). He thereupon communicated this information to the respondent and, at respondent's suggestion, they entered into an agreement jointly to submit a bid in respondent's name to the Office of Emergency Management in response to invitations to bid to be issued by that office, at the price at which the respondent had theretofore agreed to manufacture the tokens for petitioner as his sub-contractor plus fifteen percent thereof for petitioner which was to compensate him for his expenses and his work and the balance was to be his profit (R. 14, 37-40). That bid price was exactly the same price petitioner had intended bidding in his own name when it was contemplated that respondent would merely act as petitioner's sub-contractor (R. 39).

Petitioner and respondent continued to work together in the furtherance of their agreement and jointly submitted

their bid in respondent's name for the Government contract which was to be let by competitive bidding. When it became known that said bid was the low bid, respondent repudiated its agreement with the petitioner (R. 17, 18, 19, 22). The contract for the manufacture of the ration tokens was shortly thereafter awarded to the respondent by the Office of Emergency Management on the basis of said bid, and substantial profits were realized therefrom. Petitioner then brought his action below to recover his share of the profits pursuant to said agreement (R. 2).

While the case was pending on the trial calendar in the District Court, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the contract sued on was illegal and void on the ground of public policy (R. 35). The District Court granted the motion on "the general principle laid down broadly in Tool Co. *v.* Norris, 2 Wall. 45," and because the tendency of the agreement "was to have the government pay fifteen percent more than it would presumably have paid under the circumstances" (R. 41). From the judgment for the respondent entered on the order granting the motion for summary judgment (R. 42), petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and that Court affirmed the judgment on June 20, 1946 (R. 48). The opinion of the Court of Appeals was written by Mr. Justice Bennett Champ Clark, and the entire opinion is in the record (R. 45-47).

On the appeal, petitioner urged that:

(i) The contract sued on was not a contract for the procurement of a Government contract on a contingent basis and, therefore, the principle of *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris, supra,* relied on by the trial judge, was not applicable;

(ii) Even if the contract were construed to provide for contingent compensation for procuring a Government contract, the contract was not against public policy but was

legal and valid since no improper or corrupt means were used or contemplated in its procurement, notwithstanding the broad but partially overruled doctrine of *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris, supra,* and the Government contract itself was subject to award by competitive bidding and not by negotiation; and

(iii) Petitioner and respondent were joint enterprisers in bidding on and performing the Government contract, and such enterprise was not illegal even if it had the incidental effect of lessening of competition to the extent that there was one less bidder.

By its decision, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

(i) and (ii) held the contract to be "illegal at its inception and hence void and unenforceable" (R. 47), basing its ruling solely on the principle of *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris, supra,* and disregarding entirely the absence of the actual or contemplated use of improper or corrupt means and the fact that the Government contract was to be awarded by competitive bidding thereby negativing possible personal influence; and

(iii) refused to hold that the contract created a joint enterprise.

Jurisdiction

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was rendered on June 20, 1946 (R. 45). Jurisdiction of this Court is based on Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925, Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 28 U. S. C. A., Section 347(a).

Questions Presented

1. Is the broad principle of *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris, supra,* upon which the decision below was based, still good

law, insofar as it does not distinguish between cases where improper or corrupt means are used or contemplated and cases where such means are not used or contemplated?

2. Is *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris, supra,* applicable where the award of the Government contract is made by competitive bidding?

3. Did a joint enterprise exist between petitioner and respondent, and was it illegal because the joinder of parties in the enterprise had the incidental effect of lessening competition by reducing by one the number of persons bidding on the Government contract?

Reasons Relied On for Allowance of the Writ

Petitioner relies on the following reasons why a writ of certiorari should be granted to review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:

1. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has decided a question of general importance to the country at large. In connection with the recent vast war-time procurement program, the Government has completed an unprecedented volume of contracting. The effect of the decision below is to make all contracts for compensation contingent upon the procurement of Government contracts void on the ground of public policy, regardless of the bona fides of the parties to the contract and regardless of their use or contemplated use of proper or non-corrupt means.

2. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has failed to give effect to applicable decisions of this Court:

(a) By holding that no joint enterprise existed, thereby failing to give effect to the principle announced

by this Court in *Hyer* v. *Richmond Traction Co.*, 168 U. S. 471, 42 L. Ed. 547.

(b) By adopting the original announcement of this Court in *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris, supra*, without giving proper effect to the later decisions of this Court which have restricted the breadth of the doctrine there announced.

Steele v. *Drummond*, 275 U. S. 199, 72 L. Ed. 238;
Valdes v. *Larrinaga*, 233 U. S. 705, 58 L. Ed. 1163.

Prayer

WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays for the allowance of a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in this case there entitled "Max Silverman, appellant, vs. Osborne Register Company, appellee, No. 9185," that said cause may then be reviewed and determined by this Court and the judgment below (155 F. (2d) 879) may then be reversed.

MAX SILVERMAN,
Petitioner;
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Opinion Below

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia appears at page 45 of the Record, and is officially reported at 155 F. (2d) 879.

Questions Presented

The questions presented are stated in the petition, *supra*.

Specification of Errors

1. The contract created a valid joint enterprise which was outside the scope of *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris*.

2. The lower Court erred in granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment and in ruling that the contract sued on was "illegal at its inception and hence void and unenforceable" (R. 47) under the rule announced in *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris*.

3. *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris* is not good law insofar as it does not distinguish between cases where improper or corrupt means are used or contemplated and cases where such means are not used or contemplated.

4. *Providence Tool Co.* v. *Norris* does not apply where the Government contract is awarded by competitive bidding.

ARGUMENT

The writ should be granted because the opinion below erroneously applied the doctrine of Tool Co. v. Norris and failed to give effect to applicable decisions of this Court.

1. *In ruling that there was no joint enterprise the opinion below failed to give effect to Hyer* v. *Richmond Traction Co., 168 U. S. 471, 42 L. ed. 547.*

In the Court below petitioner urged that he and respondent were engaged in a joint enterprise to obtain and per-

form the Government contract for the manufacture of ration tokens, and that the principle of the *Tool Co.* case did not apply because the agreement to pay compensation to petitioner was not for services in procuring the Government contract. Nevertheless, the opinion states that "it would be a travesty on the term to dignify this bargain by calling it a 'joint venture' " (R. 47). We submit that the record justifies the conclusion that a joint venture was created, and no travesty on the term results from so characterizing the agreement because of the complete lack of any suggestion of bad faith and the sound and legitimate reasons which prompted the enterprise.

In the agreement petitioner agreed to perform, at his own expense, such services as might be required to ascertain the existence of material which was non-essential to the war effort or to develop the availability and practicability of other material which could be used effectively in the production of ration tokens by the respondent, to obtain the necessary allocation of such material to the extent required for the manufacture of the ration tokens, to confer with Government officials, to use his unusual experience in the type of work involved to settle all problems relating to the specifications to be made applicable, including the demonstration to the satisfaction of such officials that vulcanized fiber was in fact the best material to use and that its use would be to the public's interest, to arrange with Government officials for the approval of respondent's facilities to be used in manufacturing the product, and otherwise to establish the respondent's qualifications to assume a contract for the manufacture of the product in the quantity and within the time fixed by O.P.A. (R. 37). In the agreement respondent was to submit a joint bid in its own name for the manufacture of the ration tokens out of vulcanized fiber or other extruded material and perform the

manufacturing on behalf of petitioner and itself (R. 14, 37). Factually and legally the parties became joint enterprisers for the purpose of bidding and performing any contract that might result therefrom.

It should also be noted that petitioner originally intended to bid in his own name and make his usual arrangement with the respondent for the necessary manufacturing, in quite the same manner as respondent had frequently acted as petitioner's sub-contractor (R. 11, 39, 40). The agreement to join in bidding in the name of one of the parties was reasonable, honest and was for a legitimate purpose. The agreement between the parties was prompted only by the fact that petitioner had become disqualified to bid in his own name because the Government had adopted a policy requiring close surveillance over the tokens during manufacture, and because thereof the bidder had to be the owner of the manufacturing facilities.

The relationship between joint venturers or joint enterprisers is similar to the relationship between partners and is governed by partnership law. While the term partnership generally characterizes a general and continuing venture, a joint enterprise designates a venture limited to one transaction. It is not necessary to constitute a joint enterprise that the parties furnish capital or services in equal amount. If they agree what each is to do or contribute and agree on the sharing of profits, a joint enterprise is created.

Kasishke v. *Baker*, 146 F. (2d) 113;
Aiken v. *Mills*, 144 F. (2d) 23;
Motter v. *Smyth*, 77 F. (2d) 77;
Dexter & Carpenter v. *Houston*, 20 F. (2d) 647;
In re Asiatic Exploration, 41 F. (2d) 230;
Annotation 63 A. L. R. 909.

In *Hyer* v. *Richmond Traction Co.*, *supra*, plaintiff and defendant had separately negotiated with a city for a street

railway franchise. They then agreed to cooperate so as jointly to obtain the franchise and divide equally the profits. The defendant obtained the franchise in its name and later refused to recognize plaintiff's one-half interest. This Court said:

> "As said by the New York court of appeals in Atcheson *v.* Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147, 151: 'A joint proposal, the result of honest cooperation, though it might prevent the rivalry of the parties and thus lessen competition, is not an act forbidden by public policy. Joint adventures are allowed. They are public and avowed, and not secret. The risk, as well as the profit, is joint and openly assumed. The public may obtain at least the benefit of the joint responsibility, and the joint ability to do the service. The public agents know, then, all that there is in the transaction, and can more justly estimate the motives of the bidders and weigh the merits of the bid.' . . . It may be noticed that there is nothing in the agreement reduced to writing, or as interpreted by the facts stated, which tends to show any thought or purpose of using corrupt or improper influences to secure the action of the city council. So that, upon the record as it stands, the question is, narrowly, whether any agreement to unite between parties who have applied, or contemplate application, for a franchise is, under all circumstances, necessarily void as against public policy.
>
> "The case is also easily distinguishable from those contracts merely to abstain from bidding. An agreement not to bid tends to diminish the number of bidders and thus prima facie to lessen the probable profitableness of the sale or contract. Yet, even in cases of public sales, the rule laid down by this court is that agreements to unite in a bidding are not per se void. Some other element than the mere fact of union must exist before the agreement is to be condemned. Kearney *v.* Taylor, 15 How. 494, 14 L. ed. 787. . .
>
> "The observations thus made show that every case must be determined upon its peculiar facts and circum-

stances, and the courts, before condemning an agreement to unite in a bid, must see that the agreement is such as really destroys the value of competitive bidding. . . ."

The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of *Anderson* v. *Blair*, 202 Ala. 209, 80 So. 31, held that an agreement between plaintiff and defendant to use their joint efforts to obtain a Government contract for the construction of a military camp in which they were to contribute services and share in the profits after the contract was obtained, was a valid agreement. That court said:

"Appellee lays stress upon the decision in Tool Co. *v.* Norris, 2 Wall. 45, 17 L. ed. 868. In that case the court made use of this very broad expression: 'All agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the Government, or the regular administration of justice, or the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against public policy.' In Lyon *v.* Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 235, 93 Am. Dec. 502, Judge Hunt, afterwards on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, expressed the opinion that the Tool Company case was not well considered, and in Bush *v.* Russell, supra, we indulged quotations from later decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which very clearly demonstrated that the language of the Tool Company case was too broad, and that it is legitimate to employ agents to lay before officers authorized to contract for government all such information as may apprise them of the character and value of the articles offered, and enable them to act for the best interest of the country . . . agreements to procure Government contracts by 'lobbying', that is, by secret and corrupting influences, or by personal influence, are void as against public policy; but, where the contract evidences a purpose to engage in a fair business enterprise and there is no concealment of the agency, it is good and should be enforced."

2. *In ruling that the agreement was void because of public policy within the doctrine of Tool Co.* v. *Norris, the opinion below failed to give effect to Steele* v. *Drummond, 275 U. S. 199, 72 L. ed. 238 and Valdes* v. *Larrinaga, 233 U. S. 705, 58 L. ed. 1163.*

After citing the *Tool Co. case,* the opinion below states that the contract sued on was "patently against public policy" and "was illegal at its inception and hence void and unenforceable" (R. 47). The opinion does not give any reasons why the *Tool Co.* case is controlling. It says that the "trial court correctly applied the underlying principle of the Tool Co. case" (R. 46). The trial court had said that "the general principle laid down broadly in *Tool Co. v. Norris,* 2 Wall. 45, 54 is applicable" (R. 41).

The principle of the *Tool Co.* case is that all contracts for compensation contingent upon the procurement of Government contracts are void because "they suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil, and strikes down the contract from its inception" (2 Wall. 45, 55). The principle declared by that case is that the absence of anything sinister or corrupt on the one hand, or the presence of good faith on the other, does not affect its sweeping pronouncement of invalidity on public policy grounds.

In the case at bar, respondent has effectively conceded, both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals, that petitioner neither used nor contemplated the use of any improper, sinister or corrupt means. There is nothing in the record that even remotely suggests any such use or contemplation.

It was petitioner's contention below, and it is his contention here, that the contract between the parties was not a contract to procure an award of a Government contract.

The essence of the contract was the creation of a legitimate joint venture whereby each party was to perform certain duties and each was to share in the profits received. However, in view of the lower court's interpretation, which petitioner contends was wrong, it is petitioner's submission that even if the element of compensation contingent upon the procurement of a Government contract is involved, the contract here involved should be upheld notwithstanding the broad language of the *Tool Co.* case.

Petitioner submits that the sweepingly broad language of the *Tool Co.* case is not good law today, and the later decisions of this Court have definitely narrowed the breadth of the doctrine there originally announced and which the Court below adopted. The means actually used or contemplated to be used is a material and vital factor affecting legality, and it is petitioner's submission that, according to the later decisions, that factor is now determinative of legality.

Steele v. *Drummond,* 275 U. S. 199, 72 L. Ed. 238;
McGowan v. *Parish,* 237 U. S. 285, 59 L. Ed. 955;
Nutt v. *Knut,* 200 U. S. 12, 50 L. Ed. 348;
Oscanyan v. *Winchester Repeating Arms Co.,* 103 U. S. 261, 26 L. Ed. 539;
Houlton v. *Nichol,* 93 Wis. 393, 67 N. W. 715;
Hall v. *Anderson,* 18 Wash. (2d) 625, 140 P. (2d) 266 Annotation 46 A. L. R. 199.

In *Steele* v. *Drummond, supra,* this Court said, at page 205:

> "And it is a matter of great public concern that freedom of contract be not lightly interfered with. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. *v.* Voight, 176 U. S. 498, 505. The meaning of the phrase 'public policy' is vague and variable; there are no fixed rules by which to determine what it is. It has never been defined by the

courts, but has been left loose and free of definition, in the same manner as fraud. . . .

"It is only in clear cases that contracts will be held void. The principle must be cautiously applied to guard against confusion and injustice. . . . Detriment to the public interest will not be presumed where nothing sinister or improper is done or contemplated."

Today, public policy objections are not presumed where nothing sinister or improper is done or contemplated. It is not the tendency of the agreement toward evil that determines whether public policy will strike it down, but whether in the particular case improper or corrupt means are used or contemplated to be used, that is, whether actual or potential harm to the public interest is made to appear. There is no presumption that corrupt or improper influences have been or will be used or that the public interest will suffer as a result of the Government entering into a contract which will be profitable to the person who sought its award. It is well established law that, until the contrary is clearly shown, the law presumes that the parties to a contract intended to accomplish a legal purpose. It is equally well established that contracts will not be declared void on public policy grounds except in cases free from doubt. In such cases real prejudice to the public interest must be affirmatively shown.

12 Am. Jr. 710;
Anno. 46 A. L. R. 201.

The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 562, relating to "Bargains for Procuring Public Contracts," states as follows:

"A bargain to endeavor to secure a government contract by presenting to the official having power to make the contract inducements except such as relate to the

> desirability on public grounds of entering into the contract, is illegal; but if no influence other than those are bargained for, or contemplated, the bargain is not illegal."

The second illustration under that section reads as follows:

> "A, a manufacturer of goods, agrees with B to pay him a commission for all contracts that B can procure for purchase of goods of A's manufacture. . . . If no influence of a personal nature is bargained for or contemplated, the agreement is not illegal."

Section 563 of the Restatement relates to the contingent nature of the compensation, and states:

> "The fact that the compensation fixed in a bargain for efforts to secure legislation or official action is contingent on success, is not conclusive evidence that improper means are contemplated in securing the desired results."

Presumably, the contingent nature of the compensation would be just one factor, to be considered with all other evidence, in determining an issue as to whether improper means were used or contemplated.

In the case of *Valdes* v. *Larrinaga, supra,* the plaintiff was to receive a ten percent interest in the concession by the Government to a riparian owner of the right to utilize water power in developing electricity. Plaintiff's interest was based on his agreement to take the necessary steps to present the matter to the Secretary of War and to the Military Government of Puerto Rico, including the submission of plans, specifications and other technical data. This Court upheld the validity of plaintiff's contract for compensation. Although the marked factual similarity of that case would

appear to make that decision authoritative, it was not cited in the opinion below.

Conclusion

We respectfully submit that it is impossible to reconcile the decision below with *Steele* v. *Drummond, supra,* and *Valdes* v. *Larrinaga, supra,* if the case at bar is examined in its true light, that is, that no improper or corrupt means were either used or contemplated to be used. The foregoing submission is made on the theory that this Court may not be disposed to review the interpretation placed on the agreement by the Courts below to the effect that it constituted an agreement to pay compensation contingent upon the procurement of a Government contract. If such review is made, it is further submitted that the interpretation made below would be found to be incorrect, and the agreement should have been interpreted as a valid joint enterprise.

With respect to the lower Court's ruling of invalidity on public policy grounds, the following extract from the opinion by Sir George Jessel, M. R., in *Printing Co.* v. *Sampson,* L. R. 19 Eq. Cas. 462, should be noted:

> "It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced by courts of justice."

It is respectfully urged that a writ of certiorari should issue to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia so that the questions raised herein may be re-

viewed by this Court and the decision below may then be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

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(6708)

INDEX.

Page

Opinion below and jurisdiction 1

Statement of the case 2

Argument 7

The question is local to the District of Columbia and is not of general importance 7

The decision of the Court of Appeals was clearly correct 8

TABLE OF CITATIONS.

Associated Wisconsin Contractors v. Lathers, 235 Wis. 14, 291 N. W. 770 (1940) 9

Atlas National Bank v. Holm, 71 Fed. 489 (C.C.A. 7th, 1896) 8

Cianciarulo v. Caldarone, 30 A. (2d) 843 (R. I., 1943). 8

City of Oakland v. California Const. Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 573, 104 P. (2d) 30 (1940) 8

Constructors Assn. of Western Pennsylvania v. Seeds, 142 Pa. 59, 15 A. (2d) 467 (1940)..... 9

Crocker v. United States, 240 U. S. 74 (1916)..... 9

Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose Telegraphie M. B. H. v. Brown, 64 App. D. C. 357, 78 F. (2d) 410 (1935), cert. den. 296 U. S. 618 (1935) 9

Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U. S. 71 (1906)..... 9

In re Salmon, 145 Fed. 649 (W. D. Mo., 1906)..... 8

Kentucky Association of Highway Contractors v. Williams, 213 Ky. 167, 280 S. W. 937 (1926)..... 9

Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 16 How. 314 (1853) 9

Noonan v. Gilbert, 63 App. D. C. 30, 68 F. (2d) 775 (1934) 9

Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeater Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 (1880) 9

Pittsburgh Dredging & Construction Co. v. Monongahela & Western Dredging Co., 139 Fed. 780 (W. D. Pa., 1905) 8

Providence Tool Company v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45 (1864). 9

Reinstine v. Rosenfield, 111 F. (2d) 892 (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) 8

Page

Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1932)
Section 517, Examples 4 and 6 8
Steele v. Drummond, 275 U. S. 199 (1927) 9
Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441 (1874) 9
Valdes v. Larrinaga, 233 U. S. 705 (1913) 9
Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937)
Section 1663 8

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1946.

No. 522.

MAX SILVERMAN, *Petitioner,*

v.

OSBORNE REGISTER COMPANY, a Corporation.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

BRIEF OF OSBORNE REGISTER COMPANY IN OPPOSITION.

Opinion Below and Jurisdiction.

The citation of the opinion below, 155 F. (2d) 879, and the statement of the jurisdiction are correctly given in the petition.

Statement of the Case.

The petitioner, Max Silverman, brought this action in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia claiming $280,000 from the Osborne Register Company for breach of an alleged contract which he vaguely

characterized in his complaint as an agreement "to join their resources for the purpose of consummating a contract with the United States for the manufacture and sale of ration tokens" (3).* After taking Mr. Silverman's deposition, and relying solely upon that deposition, the Osborne Register Company moved for summary judgment on the ground that the alleged contract was against public policy and illegal** (35). This motion was granted and the suit was dismissed (42). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the dismissal (48).

The nature of the alleged contract upon which Mr. Silverman based his claim had remained vague and indefinite until his deposition was taken. That deposition purported to be a complete statement of Mr. Silverman's claim. Mr. Silverman testified that his contract was made with one Wiley Osborne (13, 14); that he had no conversations with Mr. Osborne during the period involved in this suit other than those which he described in his deposition (27, 28); that there was no formal contract in writing (27); and that he had told the complete story of the transaction to the best of his recollection (27).

The facts established by the deposition are clear. Mr. Silverman is in the business of selling pins and souvenirs (8), with an office at 120 West Forty-second Street, New York City (9). His force consists of a secretary, stenographer and himself, with another man who does a little work from time to time, but is not a regular employee (9). Mr. Silverman has no factory (9). The Osborne Register Company is a manufacturer of tokens, coins and emblems (2, 5). Mr. Silverman purchases his pins and souvenirs from such manufacturers and makes a profit on resales (9, 10).

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* All references are to the pages of the transcript of record herein unless otherwise indicated.

** The Osborne Register Company also denied that it had any contract with Mr. Silverman (5), but for the purpose of its motion for summary judgment relied solely on the statements of Mr. Silverman's deposition, which must therefore be assumed to be true in the present review.

The character of Mr. Silverman's former dealings with the Osborne Register Company is shown by their mutual arrangement for the manufacture and sale of Red Cross blood donor pins. Mr. Silverman described this transaction as follows:

> "Now in so far as the Red Cross pin, I have placed an order for a million pins and buttons with the Osborne Register Company. (9).
> ". . . and on this Red Cross blood donor pin, may I add that I bought this pin and the buttons from Osborne Register Company for about $30 some odd a thousand, and while I spent an additional $10 on them I realized $60 odd a thousand. That made it quite a handsome profit." (10).

In stating his contention of how the alleged contract on which he now sues was made, Mr. Silverman said:

> " . . . on or about the 20th day of August, 1943, I telephoned Osborne. I told Wiley to send me some fiber tokens, some about the size of a little less than a dime, and some about the size of a nickel or a little over a nickel or a little lower than a nickel, and give me his quotation, and see that he mails me this by air mail as I will need same the following day, and give me his price so that I can bid on a contract.
> "On the 21st day of August I received a letter quoting me prices and enclosing some samples." (11, 12).

Mr. Silverman then described his discussions with officials of the OPA on August 21, 1943, and said that these officials were much impressed but that they finally told Mr. Silverman that he could not bid for the ration token contract because he did not have a factory (13). Mr. Silverman continued:

> "He then asked me where my factory was and I told him I had no factory. He said if you haven't got a factory you won't be able to bid, and I asked him why I would not be able to bid, I am now delivering a badge pin to you, and I have an order for a quarter of a million pieces, and you are pleased with the pro-

duction and you can check that with your purchasing department and Office of Emergency Management, they will bear me out.

"He said, 'I don't care anything about the badge business, this is one job if I have anything to do with it, it will be all from the manufacturer,' and I asked him his reason and he said, 'This job is so big that it is comparable to a Government mint.'

"He said 'We will have to first examine the plant to make sure that we can have our own guards, we can have surveillance over this particular plant, we almost would have to run the plant in order to protect the manufacturer of this article and see that it doesn't get into the hands of the people who are working at it, or that the tools and dies will not be stolen out of these, because this is going to be treated the same as currency is treated, and therefore it will make it impossible for you to bid on this contract.'" (13).

Mr. Silverman went on to say:

"This was Saturday night. I then left for New York and got home on Sunday. On Monday morning from my office I phoned Osborne and said:

"'Wiley, I received the letter and prices and your samples Saturday afternoon, and I sat around all Saturday afternoon until I could see these proposals at the Office of Price Administration, and after explaining to them and they being enthusiastic with the goods I ran into a hitch,' and he said 'What was the hitch,' and I explained to him that what Mr. Carolen told me and I said 'I better go out and get myself a factory, or else a manufacturer to do the bidding for me.'

"Whereupon Wiley said, 'Are you crazy? What do you have to have any manufacturer do the bidding for you? Didn't I tell you that if you could get them to use fiber that I had no deal on with Scoville because the only deal I have with Scoville is on pressed paperboard, and now if you get them to the point where they are going to use fiber, O. K., Max, I will do the bidding. What do you want me to tack on?' And I said '15 per cent above the price you quote me in your letter of August 20th,' he said 'That is fine, that suits me to perfection,' and I requested him to send some samples to the attention of Mr. S. M. Billig at the

> Census Building, and he told me that 'I will carry on from that point and report to me from time to time.'" (13, 14).

Mr. Silverman repeated:

> "He told me 'What do you want to tack on?' I said '15 per cent above the cost,' and he said O. K. and he said 'I will do the bidding.'" (15).

Mr. Silverman then testified that he kept in touch with developments (16), that he took Mr. Esslin of the OPA to Cincinnati to see the Osborne Register Company plant (17), and that he then went back to Washington and got a lot of people to know that he "was interested." (19). He testified:

> "I saw the possibility of a big contract that I could grab off and make some money, and I spent all my time and energy on it." (20).

The opening of bids was on October 4, 1943. (21). The Osborne Register Company was the successful bidder. (22).

Mr. Silverman stated his contention as follows:

> "Q. As I understand it your contention is that Mr. Osborne promised to add to his bid 15 per cent of the price he had quoted you for small size tokens, that is, 15 per cent over $1.05 per thousand, and in that you were to get the 15 per cent. Is that right?
> "A. That is correct.
> "Q. That is what you contend?
> "A. I don't contend. He agreed." (31)

In response to questions by his attorney Mr. Donovan, Mr. Silverman said:

> "Q. I have just one question.
> "I believe your answer when you talked to Mr. Osborne on the 23rd of August and you said something about tacking 15 per cent on that, that was 15 per cent on the small token.
> "Was any mention made as to the particular size token at that time on the 23rd of August?

"A. The understanding was 15 per cent on any token we were to contract. At that time the plan was still vague and indefinite. They didn't have the right size. They didn't have the right size at that time. At that meeting of September 27th they decided in decimal points and finally arrived at .062." (33).

On redirect examination, Mr. Silverman testified:

"By Mr. Gordon:

"Q. I don't believe I quite understood the 15 per cent. The 15 per cent was to be added to what figure?

"A. 15 per cent was to be added to any figure that Wiley was going to bid on, and in this case it happened to be on the small one.

"Q. That is, Wiley was to determine a figure and then add 15 per cent to it and quote the Government the total price? Is that right?

"A. That is right.

"Q. And then out of what he received from the Government he was to give you the 15 per cent?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. But there was no agreement as to what the price to be quoted the Government was, because you didn't know at that moment just what that ought to be. Is that right? (33, 34).

". . . Mr. Donovan. Have you answered the question?

"By Mr. Gordon:

"Q. You were saying it was a closed bid and nobody knew what the price would be.

"A. That is right.

"Q. But it is your contention that whatever the Osborne Register Company got from the Government would be divided into 115 parts and they would take 100 and you would take 15.

"A. All I knew he was supposed to add on 15 per cent if and when we were bidding. That was my contract, or else I would have bought myself a factory and I would have manufactured these myself, and he told me it wasn't necessary." (34)

Thus, the testimony of Mr. Silverman was that it was agreed between him and Osborne on behalf of the Osborne

Register Company that in consideration of Mr. Silverman's refraining from acquiring a factory of his own and refraining from bidding on the ration token contract, the Osborne Register Company would increase its proposed bid to the Government by 15 per cent and would pay the 15 per cent to Mr. Silverman if its bid was accepted. Although not expressly stated, it is implied that, as an additional consideration, Mr. Silverman would aid in securing the contract for the Osborne Register Company.*

Argument.

The Question is Local to the District of Columbia and is Not of General Importance.

The question involved in the decision below was whether or not the alleged agreement, as described in the deposition of Mr. Silverman, was void as against public policy. The mere fact that the alleged agreement between Mr. Silverman and the Osborne Register Company had to do with the proposed manufacture of ration tokens for the United States did not make such an agreement dependent in any way upon Federal law. Certainly no question of the Constitution, or a treaty, or a statute of the United States is involved. The problem is solved by applying the common law relating to contracts, and when the highest court of the

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* In an attempt to escape from Mr. Silverman's testimony, and after it had become apparent that the motion for summary judgment would be granted, Mr. Silverman's counsel filed an affidavit stating their theory of the case (36). This affidavit did not comply with Rule 56, in that it did not set forth facts which would be admissible in evidence, but merely the conclusions of counsel. It did not, and could not, change the direct testimony of Mr. Silverman contained in his deposition and the District Judge so ruled (41). Many of the conclusions of that affidavit are repeated in the present petition, and we respectfully submit that they should be disregarded to the extent that they differ from Mr. Silverman's deposition.

District of Columbia has made its decision there is no reason to carry further such a case arising in that jurisdiction.

The question therefore is not one "of general importance to the country at large", as contended in the petition.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals Was Clearly Correct.

1.

The alleged agreement is illegal and unenforceable as against public policy because it provided that the Osborne Register Company should increase the amount of its bid on a Government contract and pay the amount of the increase to Mr. Silverman in return for a promise by Mr. Silverman not to bid on the same contract. The very concept of public bidding assumes that there will be open competition and any agreement having the tendency to prevent such competition is contrary to the public interest. Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) Section 1663; Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1932) Section 517, Examples 4 and 6; *Atlas National Bank* v. *Holm*, 71 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 7th, 1896); *Pittsburgh Dredging & Construction Co.* v. *Monongahela & Western Dredging Co.*, 139 Fed. 780 (W. D. Pa., 1905); *In re Salmon*, 145 Fed. 649 (W. D. Mo., 1906); *Reinstine* v. *Rosenfield*, 111 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); *City of Oakland* v. *California Const. Co.*, 15 Cal. (2d) 573, 104 P. (2d) 30 (1940); *Cianciarulo* v. *Caldarone*, 30 A. (2d) 843 (R. I., 1943).*

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* Counsel for Mr. Silverman seek to avoid the illegality of the alleged contract by contending that it was a joint adventure. It is apparent, however, that the alleged agreement did not involve a sharing of profits, an essential element. The fifteen per cent was to be paid outright to Mr. Silverman regardless of the financial results from the operation of the proposed Government contract (31, 33, 34). As the Court of Appeals said:

> "It would be a travesty on the term to dignify this bargain by calling it a 'joint venture'. Silverman thought he had a sure thing, admittedly at the government's expense, and without risk to him." (47.)

2.

In this instance competition was not only stifled but an undertaking was made in connection therewith which directly and materially increased the bid which was made to the Government and hence the cost to the Government. In such circumstances the direct injury to the public is patently clear, and the entire understanding must be declared void. Indeed, a mere arrangement increasing a bid to the Government even without an agreement which stifles competition, would be sufficient to make the contract illegal. *Kentucky Association of Highway Contractors* v. *Williams,* 213 Ky. 167, 280 S. W. 937 (1926); *Constructors Assn. of Western Pennsylvania* v. *Seeds,* 142 Pa. 59, 15 A. (2d) 467 (1940); *Associated Wisconsin Contractors* v. *Lathers,* 235 Wis. 14, 291 N. W. 770 (1940).

3.

The alleged agreement was also illegal and unenforceable as against public policy because it required the payment of a fee to Mr. Silverman contingent upon his securing a contract for the Osborne Register Company from the United States Government. That such a contract is illegal under the law of the District of Columbia has been established by many decisions. *Marshall* v. *Baltimore and Ohio R. R.,* 16 How. 314 (1853); *Providence Tool Company* v. *Norris,* 2 Wall. 45 (1864); *Trist* v. *Child,* 21 Wall. 441 (1874); *Oscanyan* v. *Winchester Repeater Arms Co.,* 103 U. S. 261 (1880); *Hazelton* v. *Sheckells,* 202 U. S. 71 (1906); *Crocker* v. *United States,* 240 U. S. 74 (1916); *Noonan* v. *Gilbert,* 63 App. D. C. 30, 68 F. (2d) 775 (1934); *Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose Telegraphie M. B. H.* v. *Brown,* 64 App. D. C. 357, 78 F. (2d) 410 (1935), cert. den. 296 U. S. 618 (1935).

Providence Tool Co. v. *Norris* and the other cases cited above have not been overruled or limited by *Valdes* v. *Larrinaga,* 233 U. S. 705 (1913), and *Steele* v. *Drummond,* 275

U. S. 199 (1927), upon which counsel for Mr. Silverman now rely. Those decisions are based on their own peculiar facts, and their facts bear little relation to those in the present case, where, according to Mr. Silverman's deposition, one party secretly promised to increase its bid to the Government by 15 per cent and to pay that 15 per cent to the other party in consideration of the other party's making no bid and attempting to secure the contract for the first party.

Surely such a contract is against public policy and is illegal. In the words of the District Court (41), which were quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals (46):

> "The tendency of such an agreement as we have here, apart from other questions, was to have the Government pay 15 per cent more than it would presumably have paid under the circumstances. Such a contract is illegal and void on the ground of public policy and as a consequence the courts have no alternative in such a situation but to so declare it."

Respectfully submitted,

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